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Abstract—Robotic-assisted minimally invasive surgery (MIS)
has enabled procedures with increased precision and dexterity,
but surgical robots are still open loop and require surgeons
to work with a tele-operation console providing only limited
visual feedback. In this setting, mechanical failures, software
faults, or human errors might lead to adverse events resulting
in patient complications or fatalities. We argue that impending
adverse events could be detected and mitigated by applying
context-specific safety constraints on the motions of the robot.
We present a context-aware safety monitoring system which
segments a surgical task into subtasks using kinematics data and
monitors safety constraints specific to each subtask. To test our
hypothesis about context specificity of safety constraints, we an-
alyze recorded demonstrations of dry-lab surgical tasks collected
from the JIGSAWS database as well as from experiments we
conducted on a Raven II surgical robot. Analysis of the trajectory
data shows that each subtask of a given surgical procedure has
consistent safety constraints across multiple demonstrations by
different subjects. Our preliminary results show that violations
of these safety constraints lead to unsafe events, and there is
often sufficient time between the constraint violation and the
safety-critical event to allow for a corrective action.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing adoption of Robotic Surgical Assistants
(RSA) such as Intuitive Surgical’s da Vinci Systems, MIS
has become the standard approach to certain procedures in
urology, gynecology, and general specialties. MIS increases
precision and dexterity compared to laparoscopy and open
surgery by providing 3D magnified views of surgical field
and scaling the motions of miniaturized surgical instruments.
RSAs are designed with data logging mechanisms which
enable offline analysis of both the kinematics and video data
from the procedures. However, there is at present no way of
understanding context and differentiating between safe and
unsafe gestures during the procedure. Our goal is to use this
data to infer the surgical context during operation and provide
feedback to assist surgeons in avoiding adverse events.
Fig. 1: Example Cases where Vision Feedback is Inadequate
(from JIGSAWS Database [1]).
Previous work has demonstrated that the safety of surgery
may be compromised by human errors [2], [3], [4] or faults
in the surgical robots that cause safety-critical events during
surgery, such as unintended movements and collision of sur-
gical instruments, modification of surgeon’s intent, and unre-
sponsive robotic systems [5]. Examples of technical failures
include disruptions of the communication between the surgeon
console and the robot, causing packet drops or delays in
tele-operation [6], and accidental or malicious faults in the
robot control software [7]. Such adverse events can potentially
harm the patients, causing unexpected cuts, bleeding, or minor
injuries that further lead to complications during the procedure
or afterwards [8].
Safety in surgery is considered as an intrinsic property of
the procedure itself and is often left to the surgeons knowl-
edge about the task and the surgical system. However, the
current open-loop tele-operation setup for MIS provides only
video feedback which is inadequate for timely anticipation
of adverse events. Figure 1 shows two examples from the
JIGSAWS database [1] where poor point-of-view or occlusion
causes difficulty in precisely monitoring instrument motions,
potentially leading to errors such as wrong site injury and
unintended applied force among others.
Our analysis and simulation of several tasks from the
JIGSAWS database suggests that (1) each surgical task has
a specific pattern that is loosely followed by every surgeon
performing the task, and (2) each subtask in a particular
surgical task has specific parametric constraints which, if
violated, can lead to safety-critical events. Figure 2 shows the
trajectory of the robot end-effector in Cartesian space (x, y, z
values) for an example surgical task (debridement); annotated
with its subtasks and parametric constraints (Cartesian position
of the end-effector). The goal of our work is to explore
the possibility of assisting a surgeon operating an RSA by
Fig. 2: Changes in Constraints across a Surgical Trajectory.
The value plotted is the Euclidean distance from the origin to
the robot end-effector.
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generating a warning when a substask-specific safety-critical
parametric constraint is violated. As a first step, this work
evaluates the potential for constraint violations to be used to
reliably trigger alerts to the surgical team in advance of a
failure. Although we anticipate these alerts being incorporated
into an RSA, in this paper we do not consider or evaluate
different options for responding to a detected violation.
Contributions. This paper presents our design of a context-
aware monitoring system that identifies the current subtask of a
surgical task and observes violations of context-specific safety
constraints (Section III). The proposed monitoring system
involves a learning phase, where subtasks and associated
constraints are learned, and a monitoring phase, where viola-
tions of constraints are detected during surgery. Our detection
only focuses on the analysis of kinematics features during
surgery to overcome scenarios where vision feedback might
be compromised due to occlusion, poor image quality, or sub-
optimal point of view.
We evaluate the effectiveness of our design by analyzing
traces collected from debridement surgical task (Section IV-D).
We use the recorded video data to evaluate the performance
of the detection system, which was only permitted to use
kinematics data. Our results provide evidence that context is
necessary for safety monitoring in robotic surgery, and that by
using context it is feasible to anticipate likely failures while
there is still time for a surgeon to avoid them.
II. RELATED WORK
Previous works have explored automated surgical task seg-
mentation and skill evaluation in robot-assisted surgery. How-
ever, only a few previous works focused on ensuring safety
and security. Here, we describe the most relevant work for
our monitoring system on surgical task segmentation, surgical
skill evaluation, and safety in robotics.
Surgical Task Segmentation. Several previous works have
also considered the problem of segmenting a surgical proce-
dures into subtasks. Lalys et al. [9] focused on cues obtained
from images to identify the context for cataract surgery. The
authors use color histogram intersection and Scale Invariant
Feature Transform/Speeded-Up Robust Features (SIFT/SURF)
for detecting the context based on the texture of objects. They
use an AdaBoost classifier for detecting specific instruments
in a sub window. Our segmentation approach is based on
kinematics, but could be extended to detecting the context
based on texture of objects using their approach. Krishnan et
al. [10] use a Dirichlet Prior to infer the number of possible
clusters in the trajectory, assuming a categorical distribution.
They deploy a hierarchical Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM)
to cluster over kinematics and find the possible transitions,
followed by at least another layer of clustering using spatial
information to detect any transitions in between the ones
already found. Finally, there is clustering with respect to time,
to only include those transitions which are observed con-
sistently across multiple demonstrations to decrease spurious
transitions. The process is applied across trajectories, with
clusters that have a likelihood of an arbitrary percentage, say
70%, actually chosen. Our approach for detecting transitions
draws inspiration from the GMM approach, however, we
assume the number of subtasks is known a priori, and we only
use the kinematics features instead of using both kinematics
and vision (this is motivated by the possible inadequacies
of vision feedback and our desire to use the vision data
for independent evaluation). Other works have also looked
at surgical task segmentation such as Fard et al. [11], who
propose a soft-boundary unsupervised gesture segmentation
using an unsupervised bottom-up approach. Their method
starts from the finest possible data of the surgery and merges
it with temporally similar data until it meets a criteria.
Surgical Skill Evaluation. Several projects have focused on
monitoring trajectories for surgical skill evaluation, with the
goal of making surgery safer. Nisky et al. [12] demonstrate that
experts’ movements were more accurate, faster, and smoother
than those of novices, especially in tele-operation. However,
the JIGSAWS [1] data shows that experts do not always
score highest; indeed, in some instances, experts had the
lowest reported scores. Brown et al. [13] used an ensemble
learner, composed of different regression models, as well
as a classification learner, to evaluate skill against manually
annotated human scores. Their domain for evaluation included
depth perception, force sensitivity and robot control, which are
critical factors for evaluating the safety of tasks, with depth
perception directly related to optimal point of view while robot
control being related to the Cartesian and grasper angle of the
end-effector. While skill evaluation techniques aim to make
surgery safer by providing offline feedback, our work focuses
on providing feedback to assist surgeons during surgery.
Safety in Robotics. Most prior work on robotics safety
focused on safety of human-robot interactions. For example,
Ikuta et al. [14] focus on the control strategy of the robots in
human-care applications. Lasota et al. [15] studied the contact
force as a possible pre-collision parameter in human robot in-
teractions. This can also be applied to surgical robotics where
the forces applied by end-effectors are crucial parameters for
safety. Other parameters considered include the grasper angle
and Cartesian position, both of which affect the safety property
of the segment and consequently its integrity. Our previous
work on safety monitoring in robotic surgery [7] proposed an
anomaly detection technique based on real-time simulation of
surgical robot dynamic behavior and preemptive detection of
safety hazards such as abrupt jumps of end-effectors, but did
not consider the underlying context or the specific surgical
sub-tasks for detection.
III. CONTEXT-AWARE SAFETY MONITORING
This section explains why it is important to consider con-
text in surgical safety properties, and presents our proposed
context-aware monitoring system for detection of safety con-
straint violations before they lead to adverse events. Fig-
ure 3 shows the overall monitoring pipeline, which is divided
into two phases: Learning and Deployment (Evaluation, also
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Fig. 3: Context-Aware Safety Monitoring Pipeline
depicted in the figure, is discussed in Section IV). In the
learning phase, the system takes a set of correct trajectories as
input, identifies subtask transitions, and infers local constraints
specific to each subtask. We choose constraints over other
approaches such as signature-verification because we want to
find properties that are consistent across all surgeons doing
the same subtask. While there may be different signatures, the
constraints should be the same for all safe operations. In the
deployment phase, the safety monitor observes the trajectories,
recognizes subtask transitions, and applies the subtask-specific
constraints to detect any potential safety violations.
A. Context in Surgery
Context in surgical procedures can be organized into a
hierarchy, starting from the surgical procedure that is being
executed to the steps in the procedure to finally the specific
motions of the robot (Figure 4). Within a specific procedure
(e.g., Nissen Fundoplication) or a surgical task (e.g., suturing),
the change in context happens in the temporal domain as a
result of the change of the surgeon’s gesture or the position
and orientation of the instruments end-effectors, leading to the
corresponding change in the subtask (e.g., pull suture through).
In our work, we assume that the task itself does not change
until it has reached its end point, i.e., if the task in question is
debridement (the removal of unhealthy tissue from a wound
to promote healing), it doesn’t abruptly change to another
task, say knot tying, unless it has completely finished. As an
example, Table IV shows the subtasks in a debridement task.
Throughout the paper, we use the terms surgeme, subtask, and
segment interchangeably.
B. Task Segmentation
The first stage for our context-aware safety monitoring
framework is to detect transitions between subtasks. For this,
we implemented a hierarchical clustering approach, by model-
ing the trajectory of a given surgical task (e.g., debridement) as
a multimodal Dirichlet Distribution of c clusters, with c < N ,
where N is the number of samples in the surgical task. We
adopted an approach similar to Krishnan et al. [10] where three
layers of clustering are used to detect transitions, based on the
Cartesian position of the end-effectors, spatial changes (if any),
and temporal changes. They particularly needed the spatial
data to infer the grasper opening and closing or movement
of the insertion tool based on the current segment, which
was not directly obvious from the kinematics data. We only
use one layer of clustering based on the kinematics features
from the Raven II with all the transitions of the task being
detected within the single layer. We segment using joint values
because they provide more precise features for distinguishing
between gestures and surgical segments, compared to just
using Cartesian or Cartesian and orientation features. For over-
segmentation, we prune by using reference transitions which
are the percentage in the timeline where the transitions are
most likely to occur.
Krishnan et al. [10] use visual features in their hierarchical
clustering to deduce the state of the graspers which provide
a more accurate estimate of the grasper pose compared to
the values inferred from inverse kinematics. In this work,
we do not incorporate visual features in the segmentation
since we use them for detection of failures and evaluation
of our proposed monitoring system and want it to provide an
independent input from our kinematics based approach.
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Fig. 4: Hierarchies in Surgical Procedures (adopted from [16])
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Fig. 5: Checking of Safety Constraints in Three Different Trajectories of Debridement Task.
C. Safety Constraints
Segment-specific constraints can be learned from the past
data on safe trajectories taken for the same surgical tasks.
Typical logic-based schemes associated with Fault Detection
and Isolation (FDI) algorithms depend and rely on a set of
constant or fixed constraints [17]. For a fixed constraint, the
maxima and minima should be tight enough to reliably detect
impending failures (low false negative rate), without being
violated on safe trajectories (low false positive rate) due to
noise or inconsistencies in the execution of the task. Targeting
these goals, we use locally-linear adaptive constraints for
each segment. These are obtained using a learning-from-
demonstration approach by analyzing trajectories from tele-
operation data on the Raven II. Figure 5 shows an example
of the safety constraints for the Cartesian position and grasper
angle for the debridement task. These safety constraints are
derived from the state-space of all the correct trajectories.
For every correct segment, we take the highest and lowest
values of Cartesian position and grasper angle. We propose
that exceeding these constraints could lead to adverse events.
Each segment of a surgery must be intrinsically safe to
ensure the integrity of the entire procedure. Since each subtask
has its own distinguishing properties, it is important to have
distinct safety constraints for each subtask. Based on the
data from the JIGSAWS database [1], for dry lab suturing in
particular, our observation from manual analysis and review
of JIGSAW’s data showed that orientation of the needle driver
was crucial for successful needle insertion and exit. On the
other hand, for a task such as knot tying, the force with
which the knot was tightened proved to be significant, since
any higher or lower force could either make the knot too
loose or snap the string. Hence, a crucial parameter that
could discriminate between safe and unsafe actions is the
applied force. Lastly, the Cartesian coordinates of the end-
effectors along with the grasper angle are important parameters
to be considered when determining safety of motions in a
given subtask. In this paper, we use the Cartesian values of
the end-effectors along with the grasper angle as the main
parameters to monitor safety in each segment of a surgical
task. Depending on the nature of the segment, these parameters
TABLE I: Common Errors in Surgery
Error Task Reason
Unintentional release Laparoscopic Grasper angle
of gall bladder [2] cholecystectomies higher than usual
Droping needle/slipping Suturing of Wrong grasper
of knot after tying [3] an anastomosis angle/orientation
Too much force tearing Laparoscopic Wrong scale factor
gall bladder [4] cholecystectomies / grip too tight
Wrong site injury [19] General Wrong position
may vary but can be integrated to our pipeline.
D. Fault Model and Failure Modes
We consider human errors, mechanical faults of the robot,
and network vulnerabilities as the possible faults that might af-
fect the performance of the surgical task. Human errors might
happen due to lapses of concentration or lack of training [18].
Previous works [7], [5], [6] have documented the potential
for software and network faults and vulnerabilities causing
unwanted robotic motions. To model such errors, we use an
additive fault injection approach where errors are added to the
safety parameters of a correct trajectory for a certain amount
of time. The target parameters are the Cartesian position of the
end-effector (sudden jumps) and the grasper angle (closing or
opening of the grasper). Table I summarizes common types of
human errors reported in the literature. In our experiments, we
inject faults designed to roughly mimic such common errors.
These fault injections could also apply for mechanical faults in
the robot, where the device is producing unwanted movements,
like sudden jumps or the surgeon’s movement is not followed,
such as the grasper not opening.
Table II lists the typical failure modes that were observed
due to the fault injections in our experiments along with
the segment that was specific to each failure. Although our
reported failures may seem trivial due to our experimental
dry-lab setup, they could cause serious harm in real surgical
scenarios. For example, dropping a block in a dry-lab setting
could simulate dropping a tiny needle or cancerous tissue
during a procedure. The sudden jumps in dry-lab simulation
could result in tissue or organ damage in a surgery.
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Our experiments used the debridement task which removes
dead or harmful tissue from the body. This task contains
segments where the robot end-effector is in direct contact with
the tissue, which could potentially lead to unsafe scenarios.
For simulating debridement in a dry-lab setting, we used the
block-transfer setup, with the blocks mimicking the tissues in
real surgery. As shown in Figure 2, the debridement task can
be segmented into six distinct segments or subtasks.
A. Experimental Setup
Our experiments used a Raven II robot (Applied Dexter-
ity, Inc.), integrated with a dVTrainer tele-operation console
(Mimic Technologies, Inc.). We used a ZED Mini camera
(Stereolabs, Inc.) for 3D vision for both tele-operation and
recording. The kinematics data was logged using the native
ROS API [20] at 1000 packets per second and the vision
data was recorded with the ZED Mini SDK at 30 frames per
second (fps). For evaluation purposes, the kinematics data was
synchronized with the vision data by using their corresponding
timestamps in epoch time and converting them to datetime.
We logged kinematics and vision data from correct trajecto-
ries recorded from human subjects operating on the Raven II
robot. The subjects in our experiments did not have any experi-
ence with the surgical console and were only given 30 minutes
to familiarize themselves with the workspace and the console.
In total, we collected 10 fault-free trajectories of debridement
task from 5 subjects. This data was divided into two separate
sets for training (made up of fault-free trajectories) and testing
(made up of faulty trajectories generated using fault injection).
We used the training data to learn the segment-specific safety
constraints from the kinematics data. We used the testing data
for fault injection experiments and evaluation of the safety
monitor using vision. We labeled the transitions in segments
from the video data.
B. Fault Injection
We injected faults to the values of the safety parameters, to
test whether they lead to any failures. For this, we overwrote
the kinematics data and sent the faulty trajectory packets
using a Master Console Emulator [7] to the robot control
software. This allowed us to repeat the same trajectory or
to perturb only certain segments of the trajectory while the
rest of data remained the same. Figure 6 shows the results of
a fault injection experiment targeting the Cartesian positions
and Grasper angles. We perturb the end-effector’s position by
forcing it to go to a randomly selected value ranging from
300 to 65000 mm and grasper angle by forcing it to go to a
randomly-selected targeted value between 0.1 and 1.4 radians
for different duration, with some cases involving corruption
across segments and other cases involving just a portion of a
segment.
C. Failure Analysis
We used vision data as an independent indicator for auto-
mated detection of failures and used it as the ground-truth for
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TABLE II: Observed Failure Modes
Failure Cause Segment
Unintentional release Grasper angle too high 4
or Wrong scale factor
Failure to dropoff Grasper angle too low 5
Hitting an obstacle Wrong Cartesian position all
Wrong scale factor
evaluation of our safety monitoring system. Table II summa-
rizes the types of failures we considered, all of which were
detected automatically using the vision. Automated detection
of failures using vision not only enables more precise identi-
fication of the time of failure, but also labeling of larger data
sets collected from surgery for more comprehensive evaluation
of the safety monitor or even offline skill evaluation.
Structural Similarity Index. One approach we used to detect
failures from the vision data was based on the structural
similarity index [21]. The structural similarity index finds the
similarity measurement of two images (in our case, adjacent
frames in the video) with respect to luminance, contrast and
structure. Figure 7a shows an example where the block was
unintentionally dropped at frame 3434. In this example, the
local constraint for grasper angle was exceeded for multiple
segments before the failure. To localize the exact packet in
the kinematics where the failure occurred, we compare the
recorded video frames of the trajectory to find where the
difference between adjacent frames is greatest. As seen in
the Figure 7a, there is a sharp peak at the point of failure,
which would not have occurred if there were no failures. We
then match the timestamp of the frame with the corresponding
packet in the kinematics data to localize the failure.
Dynamic Time Warping. To detect cases where the block
is not dropped at the right position or not picked at all, the
image similarity metric is insufficient since it contains no
information about the position of the block. For these cases,
we first threshold the image to detect the block and then apply
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TABLE III: Transition Detection Accuracy
Task (Dataset) Jaccard Similarity
TSC [10] Needle Passing (JIGSAWS) 83%Suturing (JIGSAWS) 73%
This Work Knot Tying (JIGSAWS) 68%Debridement (RAVEN) 75%
TABLE IV: Average Error in Subtask Transition Detection
Subtask Name Avg. Error (∆t in frames)
0 Start -56
1 Moving to the block 76
2 Grabbing the block -69
3 Moving up -30
4 Moving to the receptacle -10
5 Dropping the block -3
6 End 0
contour detection to find its center. We compare the position
of the block as detected with a fault free trajectory and apply
dynamic time warping to find the highest deviation between
corresponding frames (Figure 7b). The highest deviation is
likely to indicate the point where a failure occurs.
D. Experimental Results
First, we report on the accuracy of the segment transition
detection, since the safety constraints applied depend on the
predicted subtask. Then, we present results to evaluate our
overall goal of accurately anticipating safety violations.
Segment Transition Detection. We use the Jaccard Similarity
to measure the percentage overlap between the predicted
transitions and the ground truth transitions. We also report the
jitter, ∆t, which measures how early or late the transitions are
predicted. For the knot tying task [1], our segmentation has an
average of 68.0% overlap with the ground truth segments of
knot tying based on only Cartesian and grasper values, whereas
the percentage overlap is lower for more complex tasks such as
suturing where the use of visual features is particularly needed.
We used two layers of clustering based on only kinematics.
The accuracy Table III can be improved by using information
from vision data, followed by loop compaction and pruning,
similar to Krishnan et al. [10]. For debridement, the average
accuracy is 75.4% . For jitter (see Table IV), the maximum
lateness between the predicted and the ground truth transition
was 76 frames, while the minimum was -3 frames.
Safety Violation Detection. Table V shows the results of
our fault injections for perturbing the Cartesian position and
grasper angle values respectively, to induce sudden jumps
that could cause unintentional release or pickup failure. It
counts instances where injection of faults led to violations
of the safety constraints and resulted in a failure prediction.
To evaluate the efficacy of the detector, we used vision data
to determine whether or not a failure actually occurred. We
consider it a successful prediction if a failure prediction is
followed by a failure, and a false positive if no failure occurs
following a failure prediction. Sometimes an injected fault
does not result in a violation of any safety constraint, so no
failure was predicted. We consider it a false negative if a
failure occurs that was not preceded by a constraint violation.
TABLE V: Safety Violation Detection Results
Simulated Predicted Actual Outcome Time to
Failure Outcome (Grandtruth) React
Scenario (Safety Monitor) Failure No Failure (seconds)
Failure (0 sd) 10 7 1.7
Sudden No Failure (0 sd) 0 3
Jump Failure (1 sd) 0 0 -
No Failure (1 sd) 10 10
Failure (0 sd) 6 2 14.4
Block No Failure (0 sd) 0 8
Drop Failure (1 sd) 6 1 11.4
No Failure(1 sd) 0 9
The timing of the failures was confirmed using the vision
data and overlaid with the kinematics data to localize the exact
packet where the failure occurred. We measured the average
time to react, defined as the time between the detection of
safety violation by the monitor and the actual occurrence
of a failure as shown in Table V. Our experiments confirm
that failures usually happen after prolonged violation of local
constraints (see Figure 6a) and there is usually enough time
between the detection of safety violation and the actual failure
(last column of Table V). These results provide optimism that
alerting a surgical team on violations of safety constraints
could be useful in preventing adverse events.
Further analysis of the fault injection results indicates that
exceeding of the grasper angle by a small margin does not
result in dropping the block, while grasper angles above 0.8
radians led to unintentional release of the block. Grasper
angles below 0.8 radians led to failure to drop the block at
the right time and place. Our experiments also indicate that
the parameters such as the time (in a segment of surgical task)
at which the faults are injected and the duration for which
they are injected play a role in causing the violation of safety
constraints. More in-depth analysis of the impact of different
fault types and locations is the subject of future work.
V. CONCLUSION
We presented preliminary results from our experiments
developing a context-aware safety monitoring system that
could alert the surgeon of the impending safety-critical events.
Our results provide encouraging evidence that there is an
opportunity for using violations of subtask-specific safety con-
straints to warn surgeons early enough to prevent impending
adverse events. Our results so far are limited to one task,
debridement, and based on a small number of trials with non-
experts using a surgical robot in a dry-lab environment. Many
challenges remain before such an approach could be used
in practice, including validating the effectiveness of safety
constraints in a realistic environment and across a range of
operators, determining a safe and effective way to convey
alerts to the surgical team, and understanding the impact of any
surgeon-assistance features on regulation of robotic devices.
Nevertheless, we are optimistic that the data available from
a surgical robot system can be used during procedures to
enhance safety.
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CODE AVAILABILITY
The code for the safety monitor and the fault injec-
tion experiments is available at the following repository:
https://github.com/UVA-DSA/ContextMonitor.
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